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ABSTRACT
Pensionsprovided in the public sector are often indexed, while
pensions in the private sector typically are not. To conduct the total
compensation comparisons that ostensibly guide government pay policy,
one must value annuities which differ in their degree of inflation pro-
tection. This paper conducts this exercise from the viewpoint of modern
finance theory, and contrasts the results with those of a representative
government, the Government of Canada. The results suggest that govern-
ments may typically understate the value of indexed pensions and overstate
the value of pensions which receive incomplete inflation protection. A
contributing factor is the apparent belief that standardizing actuarial
assumptions is sufficient to ensure comparability, in spite of the fact
that risk is ignored and that interest rate and inflation assumptions are
typically not those of the market.
Professor James E. Pesando
University of Toronto
Institute for Policy Analysis
150 St. George Street
Toronto, CanadaM55 lAl1. INTRODUCTION
In both Canada and the United States, governments are ostensibly
guided in their pay policies by the principle that total compensation
in the public sector should be comparable to that in the private sector.
Typically, pensions provided in the public sector receive betterinflation
protection. The pensions provided to federal government employees,for
example, are fully indexed to the price level, while full indexing is
quite rare in the private sector. If valid comparisons of total compensa-
tion are to be made, then fully indexed annuities as well as annuities
which receive incomplete inflation protection must be properly valued.
This problem is made difficult by the fact that fully indexed annuities
as well as those which receive incomplete inflation protection are not
sold in —andare thus not explicitly priced by —thecapital market.
This paper uses the principles of modern finance theory to value
five annuities which differ in their degree of inflation protection. Each
corresponds in a stylized way to current practice in Canada, and most are
relevant to the United States as well (Table 1). They are:(1) a fully indexed
annuity; (2) an indexed annuity subject to a cap, either fixed (the maxi-
mum adjustment is limited to x percent per year) or floating (the adjust-
ment equals the inflation rate less percent);(3) an annuity which
receives cost—of—living adjustments based on pension fund earnings in
excess of an assumed interest rate;(4) an annuity which is partially
indexed and receives adjustments equal to z percent of the inflation rate;
and (5) a nominal annuity. The paper contrasts the results suggested by
modern finance theory with those of a representative government, the
Government of Canada. The analysis suggests that governments may typically2
understate the value of fully indexed annuities andoverstatethe value of
annuities which receive incomplete inflation protection. In part, this
is due to the mistaken belief that standardizing the assumptions used in
actuarial valuations is sufficient to ensure comparability. The fact that
actuarial valuations ignore risk and typically embody interest rate and
inflation assumptions which are not those of the market receives inadequate
attention.
The paper is organized as follows. In the first section, the choice
of a discount rate for fully indexed annuities is discussed. The analysis
focuses on the problem of estimating the expected real rate of return on
the minimum variance portfolio. The second section reviews the problem
of valuing capped annuities. The third analyzes the problem of valuing
annuities receiving cost—of—living protection equal to pension fund earnings
in excess of an assumed interest rate, or by "excess" earnings. The analysis
focuses on the conditions under which these can be reduced to standard
variable annuities (and thus readily valued), as well as the complications
posed by the possible exclusion of unrealized gains and losses from the
measure of fund earnings. The fourth section analyzes the problem of
valuing partially—indexed annuities which receive adjustments equal to a
designated fraction of the inflation rate. The fifth section briefly reviews
the problem of valuing nominal annuities, and draws attention to the account-
ing veil implicit in most actuarial valuations. The total compensation
comparisons conducted by the Federal government of Canada are then reviewed,
in order to contrast the procedures used by a representative government
with those implied by modern finance theory. A suary section concludes
the paper.3
2. FULLY INDEXED ANNUITIES
The pensions provided to Federal government employees in both
Canada and the United States, and to employees of many other levels of
government as well, are fully indexed to the consumer priceindex. Since
fully indexed pensions are rare in the privatesector,1 the proper valua-
tion of these annuities is essential if the total compensation of public
sector employees is to be properly compared to that of employees in the
private sector.
In a world of no inflation, a life insurance company could perfectly
hedge an n—period, nominal (and hence real) annuity by holding a
portfolio of insured, n—period mortgages. The expected return on such a
portfolio would be the competitive rate at which such annuities wouldbe
sold. If indexed mortgages were available in a world of uncertain inflation,
an analogous result would obtain since a life company could perfectly hedge
an n—period, fully indexed annuity by holding a porfolio of n—period,indexed
mortgages.
In North America, (uncertain) inflation does exist and indexed
debt instruments are not available in the capital market. Prior studies
(Bodie (1976), Pesando and Rea (1977)) have shown that the real rate of
return on a diversified portfolio of common stocks is negatively correlated
with unanticipated inflation, as is the real rate of return on fixed—income
securities. To the extent that a life company is constrained by regulation
or by habit to hold a portfolio that consists of stocks and fixed—income
securities, the life company cannot create a portfolio which is devoid of
inflation risk. Thus the life company cannot perfectly hedge a fully indexed4
annuity. To minimize its underwriting risk,the best the life company
can do is to hold that portfolio which hasminimum variance and thus the
most stable real return. The expected real return onthis portfolio
would be the upper bound on the competitive interest rateat which a
fully indexed annuity would be sold, since shareholdersof the life
company would have to be compensatedfor bearing the residual investment
risk.
Data on the (pretax) real returns to 91—day Treasurybills,
long—term Government of Canada bonds,and common stocks for the period
1953—1980 are presented in Table 2. The annualreal return on Treasury
bills averaged 0.82 percent, with a standarddeviation of 2.02 percent.
Common stocks are much riskier, with a mean real returnof 7.97 percent
and a standard deviation of 17.02 percent. The meanreal return on long—
term Canada bonds is actually negative, reflectingthe impact of unantici-
pated (permanent) inflation, and has astandard deviation of 7.60 percent.
The real returns on bills, bonds and stocks are positivelycorrelated,
and all are negatively correlated with the rate ofinflation. In the
absence of shortselling2, the minimum variance portfolio is a portfolio
comprised exclusively of Treasury bills. Thisis the portfolio that a
life company would hold if it wished to minimize itsunderwriting risk
in issuing an n—period, fully indexed annuity.
The expected real return on bills, or about one percent,is the
upper bound on the competitiveinterest rate at which an n—period, indexed
annuity would be sold in Canada. One percentis an upper bound because
shareholders of the life company would have to becompensated for bearing5
the residual investment risk, since the real return on bills is not
constant. Note that this is the upper bound regardless of the portfolio
that the life company actually chooses to hold. If the life company
holds a portfolio of cotnon stocks to hedge the indexed annuity, the
higher expected real return is simply the compensation due shareholders
for assuming the additional investment risk. The fact that one percent
is an upper bound is also apparent if one considers the situation of an
individual who wished to provide his own retirement annuity. If he
wished to construct a variable annuity3 which provided the most stable stream
of real annuity payments, he would construct a variable annuity backed by
Treasury bills. The expected real return on this portfolio would be
about one percent, and the real stream of payments —unlikethose of a
fully indexed annuity —wouldstill be uncertain. If the individual were
sufficiently risk averse that he wished to purchase a fully indexed
annuity, he would have to compensate shareholders of the life company
for eliminating the residual investment risk. He would do so by accepting
a lower interest rate on the indexed annuity than the expected real
return on Treasury bills.
Bodie (1980) reviews similar empirical evidence for the United
States and reaches a similar conclusion. The minimum variance portfolio
is a portfolio consisting (almost)4 exclusively of Treasury bills, and
the expected real return on this portfolio is close to zero. He concludes
that the competitive interest rate at which a life company would sell a
fully indexed annuity in the United States would not exceed zero percent.
The interest rates at which n—period, indexed annuities would
be priced competitively In North American capital markets may appear rather6
low to manyobservers.In part, this result nay be viewed as a direct
cost of increased price level uncertainty. A life company must hedge
an n—period, indexed annuity by holding a one—period rather than an
n—period debt instrument. Notwithstanding this portfolio response, the
residual investment risk borne by the life company is positive and thus
exceeds that borne by the life company in a world where inflation uncertainty
is absent. Consider, for example, what would happen if indexed debt
instruments were bought and sold in North American capital markets.
Modern finance theory indicates that an n—period, index bond would be
priced to yield a higher expected real return than a one—period, index
bond (or an indexed Treasury bill) if real interest rate risk is non—
diversifiable. If so, a life company could hedge an n—period, indexed
annuity by holding n—period, index bonds (or, more precisely, n—period
index mortgages) and thus earn a higher expected real return than if it
were constrained to hold only indexed Treasury bills. In the absence of
a market for indexed debt instruments, the life company is effectively
forced to hold only bills if it wishes to issue an n—period, indexed
annuity and simultaneously minimize its risk exposure. The opportunity
to bear real interest rate risk by perfectly hedging an n—period indexed
annuity with an n—period, index mortgage is at present denied life companies
in North America, although this opportunity would clearly exist in a
world in which price level uncertainty was absent or in which indexed
debt instruments did exist. Index bonds have recently been issued by
the Government in the United Kingdom. Significantly, their market —
determinedyields do rise with their terms to maturity,5 thus providing
evidence that real interest rate risk is indeed non—diversifiable.7
3. ANNUITIESWHOSE INFLATION PROTECTION IS "CAPPED"
Thereare two ways that inflation protection may be capped. The
first, termed a fixed cap, limits the inflation adjustment to x percent
even if the change in the consumer price index exceeds that amount.The
second, termed a floating cap, provides the annuitant with inflation pro-
tection equal to the change in the consumer price index less y percent.
The Province of Ontario, for example, limits the cost—of—living adjustments
to 8 percent even if the inflation rate exceeds that amount. Fixed caps
also exist in some private sector plans in Canada (Tomenson—Alexander
(1978)), and in both private and state retirement systems in the United
States (Myers (1978)). Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some
firms in Canada follow a policy of allowing their retired workers to
absorb the impact of (say) the first 3 percent of any increase in the
consumer price index, and then make ad hoc adjustments to offset the
impact of inflation above this amount. In effect, they also provide
annuities subject to a floating cap.
If one assumes that firms whose ad hoc adjustments are based on
the floating cap make such adjustments with certainty, it is easy to value
the annuities so protected. If the floating cap is the inflation rate less
zpercent,then the real value of the annuity will decline with certainty
at y percent per year.6 These payments must be discounted at the risk—
free real rate of interest (if) to yield a net discount rate of if
plus y. At present, there is no asset in the North American capital mar-
kets which provides a risk—free real rate of return. The expected realS
return on the minimum variance or bills portfolio does, however, place
an upper bound on i. Thus i is not likely to exceed onein Canada
and zero in the United States, so that an upper bound can readily be
placed on the net discount rate.
If the inflation rate (Ti) were known with certainty, then the
valuation of an annuity subject to a fixed cap would be straightforward.
If the certain inflation rate is less than the cap (i.e. iT C x) ,then
the real value of the annuity is constant and the relevant discount rate
is simply If ii > x, then the real value of the annuity declines
with certainty at a rate equal to Tr—x. When this stream of payments is
discounted at the risk—free real rate of interest, the end result is a
net discount rate equal to (rr—x) plus
If the inflation rate is uncertain, the valuation of an annuity
subject to a fixed cap is far more complicated. Let b0be the real
value of the annuity payment at the beginning of the current period, let
be the real value of the annuity payment at the beginning of the next
period, and let l be the realization of the inflation process during the




Ineffect, the annuitant has claim to the certain real benefit
and has sold a call option on the rate of inflation with a striking price






The value of the call option is an increasing function ofaØf),anda
decreasing function of x. The important point of (1) is that thevaluation9
of the capped annuity cannot be reduced to the choice of a single and
(approximately) unchanging discount rate. To value (1), one must know
the risk—free real rate of interest (in order to take the present value
of the certain real component of b1) and one must explicitly value the
indicated call option at the beginning of each period. The value of this
option is likely to exhibit considerable variation over timein view of
the substantial serial correlation in the inflation rate. Less formally,
if today's inflation rate is high, then tomorrow's inflation rate Is also
likely to be high. This result is an important input into any attempt to
value the capped annuity, and provides an intuitive explanation as to why
it cannot be assigned a unique and thus unchanging value.
4.ANNUITIES WHOSE INFLATION PROTECTION IS FROM "E. F.SS' FUND EARNINGS
The lack of formal provisions notwithstanding, most largefirms
inCanada grant cost—of—living adjustments toretiredplan members.These
adjustments are apparently financed —atleast in part —bypension fund
earnings In excess of the interest rate assumed in the plan'svaluation.7
Indeed, future government initiatives are likely to formalizethis use for
"excess" earnings (Ontario (1982)). Large firmsin the United States
typicallygrant cost—of—living adjustments as well, althoughthese are
less generous and there is less evidence that they are linked to pension
fund performance (Bankers Trust Company (1980)). Many observers, inc'uding
Munnell(1982),have recommended that excess earnings be used by private
pensionplansin the United States to provide inflation protection.
Thevaluation of an annuity whose inflation protection is delivered
through excess earnings is straightforward if the annuity can be shown to
be equivalent to a standard variable annuity. Assume that the plan sponsor
will lower the nominal value of the annuity payment if pension fund earnings10
fall short of the assumed interest rate, so that there is nonominal floor
on the annuity payment. Assume also that the plan sponsorwill apply all
fund earnings in excess of the assumed interest rate to escalate the
annuity payment, even if this means that the real valueof the payment
increases. If so, one can proceed as if two separate transactions occur.
First, the plan member receives a lump sum payment at thedate of his
retirement equal to the promised pension benefit capitalized at the
plan's assumed interest rate. This first step establishes the assumed
interest rate as the correct discount rate to value the promised stream
of pension payments. Secondly, the plan member uses the lump sum pay-
ment to purchase a standard variable annuity, and the assumed interest
rate is used to set the initial annuity payment. This initial annuity
payment is then equal to the promised pension benefit, and rises orfalls
as the nominal return on the supporting assets exceeds or falls shortof
the assumed interestrate.8 Note that the assumed interest rate is the
correct discount rate independent of the assets actually held in the
pension fund.
There are, however, two potential complications. The first occurs
if there is a floor and/or ceiling on the use of excess earnings. The
second occurs if a non—market measure of pension fund performance is
usedto define excess earnings.
Consider, for simplicity, only the case in which there exists a
nominal floor on the annuitypayments.This possibility is motivated by
thestylized fact that the ad hoc adjustments provided by most firms tend
tobe permanent. Once a nominal pension has been increased, it is never
reduced. If these enrichments are financed by excess earnings, the implica-
tion is that the plan sponsor absorbs the shortfall when pension fund11
earnings are less than the assumed interest rate. In effect, the plan
sponsor guarantees that the pension fund will never earn lessthan the
assumed interest rate in the excess earnings scheme. This is explicitly the
case in the widely—cited Rockefeller Foundation Plan in the United States,
which grants permanent cost—of—living increases equal to the average
prime interest rate for the year less 3 percent (Heaton (1980)).
If the annuitant is provided with a variable annuity subject to a
nominal floor, the use of the assumed interest rate in the excess earnings
scheme to value the annuity will in general understate its value. In
effect, the pensioner receives a standard variable annuity plus a put
option on the nominal investment earnings of the pension fund with a
striking price equal to the assumed interest rate. If A0 is the lump
sum necessary to buy a standard variable annuity, RV is the plan's
assumed interest rate and a(R) the measure of the risk of the nominal
return that is relevant to option pricing, then the lump sum necessary
to buy this same annuity subject to a nominal floor is A such that:
=
A0+PUT(A0,RV, 0(R)) (2)
If the assumed interest rate increases, then the put option becomes more
valuable since the probability increases that pension fund earnings will
fall short of this guaranteed rate. A similar result obtains if the
risk of the assets in the pension fund increases. The latter implies,
unlike the case of a standard variable annuity, that the value of the
annuity depends upon the assets in the pension fund. Unless the value
of the put option is zero, the use of the assumed interest rate in the
excess earnings scheme to value the annuities so protected will understate12
their value. If the annuity provides for a single payment at theend of
the first period, then the value of this option will be zero if the pen-
sion fund holds only the risk—free nominal asset (bills) and if the bill
rate exceeds the plan's assumed interest rate. In the more relevant
multiperiod setting, the put option will have zero value only ifthere is
no probability in some future period that the bill rate will fallbeneath
the assumed rate.
If unrealized capital gains or losses are not included in the
measure of fund earnings, as is the explicit practice of the Teachers
Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) in the United States, then
intergenerational risk sharing is imposed on plan members. Suppose the
pension fund holds only long—term bonds. If long—term rates rise in
anticipation of future inflation, the resulting capital losses go
unrecorded. Excess earnings remain relatively stable, implying that the
real value of the annuity payments will decline in subsequent periods
when the inflation rate is higher. If it is known that unrecognized
capital losses exist on the date that an individual retires, then the
value of the annuity to him will be overstated, and conversely if unrecog-
nized capital gains are inherited. On average, however, the assumed
interest rate in the excess earnings scheme remains the correct dis-
count rate to be used in total compensation comparisons. So long as
participation is mandatory, so that retired plan members cannot game
againt the non—market measure of fund performance, the exclusion of
unrealized capital gains and losses does not complicate the valuation
problem.913
5. VALUING ANNUITIES WHICHAREPARTIALLY INDEXED TO THE INFLATION RATE
Private surveys often focus on the average degree of cost—of—
living protection provided by ad hoc adjustments as a summary measure
to be used in total compensation comparisons (Tomenson—Alexander (1978)).
For simplicity, it is useful to consider the problem of valuing an
annuity which receives adjustments equal to z percent of the inflation
rate)° The special cases where z equals zero (i.e. the annuity is
purely nominal) and where z equals 100 (i.e. the annuity is real) are
ruled out by assumption.
If these adjustments are made with certainty, then the valuation
procedure is conceptually straightforward. First, one forecasts the
inflation rate (it*)expectedto prevail over the life of the annuity,
as well as specifying its risk characteristics. The real stream of
annuity payments is expected to decline at a rate equal to(l_z)#iT*
percent per year. The appropriate interest rate to calculate the pre-
sent value of this stream of payments is the expected real return on that
efficient portfolio which generates a real income stream with the same
risk characteristics. This expected real return, plus (l_z)TT*, is
then the net discount rate to be used to value the indicated annuity.
In practice, it is likely to prove difficult to obtain a precise
estimate of this net discount rate. In large part, this is due to the
necessity of specifying in advance the distribution of future rates of
inflation. In addition, the procedure as outlined invokes the strong
assumption that adjustments equal to z percent of the inflation rate
are made with certainty.In view of the fact that firms have elected
not to incorporate this provision into their formal pension contracts,
but to proceed on an ad hoc basis, this assumption is clearly suspect.14
6.VALUING NOMINAL ANNUITIES WHICH RECEIVE NO INFLATION PROTECTION
Atpresent, life companies in Canada sell life annuities to
individuals aged 65 at an interest rate of 14 percent. This is obviously
the correct discount rate to value a purely nominal stream of promised
pension benefits. In spite of the fact that pension benefits may be
purely nominal (i.e. the sponsoring firm may have no intention of provid-
ing cost—of—living adjustments), annuities due under the terms of pen-
sion plans in Canada are typically valued at interest rates which do not
exceed 7 percent (Pesando (1981)). If workers are rational, they pre-
sumably see through this accounting veil and value their accruing pension
benefits at prevailing annuity rates in order to make the appropriate wage
concessions. As discussed in the next section of this paper, however,
it appears likely that government officials use interest rates closer
to those assumed by actuaries than those prevailing in the capital market
to value nominal pension benefits.
7.INFLATION PROTECTION ACCORDED PENSIONS AS AN INPUT INTO TOTAL COMPENSA-
TION COMPARISONS: THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE
It is instructive to contrast the valuations conducted by the
Government of Canada, which are probably typical, with those implied by
modern finance theory. To conduct total compensation comparisons, the
Government must value its fully indexed annuities relative to a composite
of those provided in the private sector.
By combining a nominal interest rate assumption of 6½ percent with
an inflation rate assumption of 3 percent, the Government effectively uses
a discount rate of (approximately) 3½percentto value the fully indexed15
annuities due under the terms of its pension plan. As noted,the risk—free
real rate of interest in Canada is likely to be boundedabove by one percent.
Abstracting from the possible political risk that indexingprovisions might
be cut back or eliminated at some futuredate, the Government is clearly
understating the value of its fully indexed annuities.
To value annuities which receive no inflation protection,the Govern—
merit uses its assumed nominal interest rate of 6½ percent.This is far
beneath the 14 percent at which life companies in Canada nowsell life
annuities to those aged 65.
To value annuities which receive inflation protection throughexcess
earnings, the Government uses the interest rateused to define excess earn-
ings. In the absence of floors or ceilings in the excessearnings scheme,
this is the correct procedure.
To value annuities which are partially indexed, theGovernment first
postulates that adjustments in the private sector typicallyequal 50 per-
cent of the inflation rate, and proceeds as if eachfirm made such adjust-
ments with certainty. The Government then uses itsassumed inflation rate
of 3 percent to imply that inflation adjustments will equal1½ percent per
year. This annual rate of escalationof the annuity payments is then sub-
tracted from the assumed nominal interest rate of 6½ percent to yield a
net discount rate of 5 percent. At present, the nominal yield on long—
term Canada bonds exceeds 15 percent, suggesting an implicitinflation
forecast of at least 10 percent. This implies that the expected rateof
decline in the real value of the partially indexed annuity is atleast
5 percent per year. Because the real value of these payments is uncertain,
they must be discounted at a rate in excess of therisk—free rate. If16
a real interest rate of (say) 3 percent is appropriate, this would imply
a net discount rate of 8 percent, which considerably exceeds the 5 percent
used by the Government.
Because the most visible plans in Canada which contain capped index-
ing provisions are in the public sector, the Federal government does not
appear to explicitly value them. The Province of Ontario,in what may be
a representative response, uses an assumed inflation rate which is less
than its 8 percent fixed cap to project its nominal annuity payments, and
then discounts them by an assumed nominal interest rate. In the 1976 valu-
ation (Ontario (1978)), the Province uses a nominal interest rate of 7.25
percent in conjunction with an inflation assumption of 5½ percent. By
implicitly treating these assumptions as certain, the Province implies
that its real annuity payments will be constant. If true, this would
require that they be discounted at the risk—free real rate of interest,
which is less than the real rate of (approximately) lz percent implied
by the inflation and nominal interest rate assumptions. Because
the inflation rate is uncertain, and thus the call option in (1)
has a positive value, it is not possible without more formal enquiry to
establish whether or not the capped annuities are indeed beingundervalued.2
To sum up, the Government of Canada employs procedures which under—
state the value of indexed annuities and typically overstate the value of
annuities which receive incomplete inflation protection. In part, this is
due to excessive reliance on standard actuarial valuations, which ignore
risk and typically use non—market interest rate and inflation assumptions.
The fact that the same actuarial assumptions are used to value public and
private sector plans, although touted by practitioners (Martel et. al.17
(1980), Carow (1981)), is largely irrelevant. Whatever their merits,
standard actuarial valuations do not provide a satisfactory basis for
calculating the value to employees of annuities which differ sharply in
their degree of inflation protection.
Uncritical dependence on standard actuarial valuations is certainly
not unique to the Government of Canada. The Civil Service Retirement System
in the United States was valued in 1979 with an interest rate assumption
of 7 percent and an inflation rate assumption of 6 percent. These assump-
tions, which the Office of Personnel Management (1981) then used in its
total compensation comparisons, suggest that fully indexed annuities are
valued at a real interest rate of one percent.13 Although Bodie (1980)
argues that a real interest rate of zero may be more appropriate, this
discrepancy is clearly less important than its Canadian counterpart. Of
perhaps more consequence is the apparent use by the Office of Personnel
Management of the nominal interest rate assumption of 7 percent —based
on the assumed inflation rate of 6 percent —tovalue the nominal annuities
provided by most private sector plans. This 7 percent is considerably less
than the then prevailing 9 to 10 percent yield on long—term U.S. Govern-
ment bonds, and suggests that the value of these nominal annuities was
overstated. As in Canada, there is no evidence that the issue of infla-
tion uncertainty and its ramifications was addressed.
Finally, because pension costs as a percent of payroll are signi—
ficant,14the potential scope for errors in these total compensation compari-
Sons Is large. The Government of Canada uses a real rate of 3½ percent to
value its fully indexed annuities, so that the present value of each dollar
of a 15—year annuity is calculated to be $11.52 .Atan interest rate of18
one percent, an upper bound on the risk—free real rate,this annuity would
cost $13.86 or 20.3 percent more. The present value of this annuity,when
treated as nominal and valued at the assumed interest rate of 6½ percent,
is $9.40. At a market interest rate of 14 percent, this annuity would
sell for $6.14 or 53.1 percent less. Thus the Government understatesthe
value of the indexed annuity that it provides by 20 percent)while over-
stating the value of the nominal annuity provided in the privatesector
by 53 percent.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The procedures suggested by modern finance theory for valuing annuities
which differ in their degree of inflation protection are summarized in
Table 1. These are not the procedures used by the Federal government in
Canada, which are probably representative of those used by governments in
general. In Canada as well as in the United States, inflation protection
is typically far better in public than in private sector pension plans.
The analysis in this paper suggests that governments may typically under-
value pensions provided in the public sector, while overvaluing those
provided in the private sector. The net result is that total compensation
comparisons are seriously flawed. To the extent that these comparisons
guide pay policy in the public sector, and to the extent that total com-
pensation paid in the public sector is not disciplined by competitive
forces,15 total compensation in the public sector may be too high on
this account.19
FOOTNOTES
1.In Canada in 1980, 98.3 percent of pension plans in the private
sector (covering 95.1 percent of plan members) had no formal pro-
visions to provide cost—of—living adjustments (Statistics Canada
(1982)). Myers (1978) reports that automatic—adjustment provisions
are also rare among private sector plans in the United States.
The discussion in the text presumes, as appears to be the case, that
nominal annuity payments will be reduced if the inflation rate is
negative. If this is not the case, then the procedures discussed in
the text will understate the value of "indexed" annuities so long
as there is a non—zero probability of deflation in some subsequent
period.
2. If short selling is permitted, the minimum variance portfolio is long
on bills (108 percent), and short on both bonds (minus 7 percent) and
stocks (minus one percent). The mean bond return reported in Table 2
cannot be viewed as an equilibrium return, and a corresponding caveat
is in order. In a portfolio consisting only of bills and stocks,
minimum variance is obtained with a long position in bills (101 per-
cent) and a short position in stocks (minus one percent).
3. Let A0 be his initial capital. Let RV be the assumed interest
rate. Then the base payment B0 of the N—period variable annuity is:
B0 =RV[l—(l+RV)N]l*A0
(Fl)
If Rt is the realized nominal return in period tonthe under—
lying portfolio, then the nominal benefit B paid in period t20





4. Bodie (1980) argues that the minimum variance portfolioin the
United States, although comprised mostly of Treasury bills,would
include a small (long) position in a diversified set of commodity
futures.
5. As of 31 March 1982, the 2's of '96 were priced at par to yield
2 percent; the 2's of '06 were priced at 96 to yield 2.32 percent;
and the 2½'s of '11 were priced at 98 to yield 2.58 percent.
6. For convenience, continuous time results are cited here and elsewhere
in the text, unless explicitly noted to the contrary.
7. The pension plans provided by most large firms inCanada and the
United States are defined benefit plans. These are plans in whichthe
employee receives a benefit equal to a given fractionof his average
or of his final earnings for each year of service, or afixed dollar
amount for each year of service. If the pension fund earns morethan
the interest rate used to value the plan, which range from4 to 7 percent
in Canada, the plan experiences an actuarial surplus.
8. Let B0 now represent the base pension payment defined by the terms
of the plan. Using the notation of footnote 3, it is as if the retiring
plan member receives the lump sum payment A0:
A0 =B0
RV[l —(l+Rv)]1 (F3)
He then uses A0 to purchase a standard variable annuity, in which21
RV is the assumed interest rate. His base pension payment is thus
as required by the plan, and the actual payments are those
indicated by (P2). Note that under excess earnings, the defined
benefit plan is effectively transformed into a defined contribution
plan at the date of the plan member's retirement. This appears to
be an additional innovation in response to the apparent increase in
price level uncertainty, as discussed by Pesando (1982).
9. Since investment opportunities have not changed, this intergenerational
risk sharing does not improve the overall efficiency of risk bearing
in the economy. A potential disadvantage is that retired workers may
fail to realize the implication of (say) a rise in long—term interest
rates which produces capital losses on the bond portfolio. These losses,
although unrealized, require an immediate reduction in real consumption
if expected real consumption is to be stabilized over the remaining
lifetimes of the annuitants (Rea (1981)).
10. In their study of inflation protection in the U.K., Brealey and Hodges
(1980) address the problem of valuing fully indexed annuities provided
to government employees against private sector pensions which are pre-
sumed to receive cost—of—living adjustments equal to 62 percent of the
inflation rate.
11. After the first draft of this paper was complete, the Government of
Canada announced as part of its austerity measures in its (June)
1982 budget that the cost—of—living adjustments to the indexed pen-
sions of civil servants would be limited to 6 percent and 5 percent,
respectively, in 1982 and 1983. Subsequent discussion in the text22
continues to abstract from political risk, although this caveatis
clearly important. There is no apparent way to quantify politicalrisk,
other than to note that it would cause the risk—free real rate to
overstate the value of the ostensibly indexed annuities.It should be
noted that the possibility of capping, either temporarily or permanently,
the inflation adjustments due retired Federal government employeeshas
also been raised in the United States.
12. The procedure used by either level of government tovalue annuities
subject to a floating cap is not known. Parallel treatment,however,
would be to escalate the projected annuity payments by theassumed
inflation rate less xpercent,and then discount this stream of pay-
ments by the assumed nominal interest rate.
13. Nunnell(l982) discusses a proposal which would permit individuals,
at the time of their retirement, to purchase a limited quantityof
index bonds from the U.S. Guvernment. These bonds would provide a
guaranteed real return of one percent. This guaranteed rate,which
implies that the bonds would be the equivalent of index Treasury
bills, is clearly an above market rate based on the analysis ofBodie
(1980). Although real Treasury bill yields in both Canada and the
United States are currently well above their historical means of one
and zero percent, there is as yet no persuasive case for arguing that
the expected real return on bills has permanently increased.
14. The Government of Canada estimates that its share of pension costs
for current service is 9.5 percent of salary, compared to 4.5 to 5.5
percent of salary for private sector firms (Nartel et.al. (1980)).23
As reported by Cajda (1981), employer contribution rates (which
appear to blend current and past service costs)for municipal employees
in the United States may exceed 70 percent of payroll! Note also that
these contribution rates are as conventionally measured and do not
take into account the limitations analyzed in the text.
15. Carow (1981) acknowledges the possibility that there may be longer
queues of workers for federal government jobs in the United States
than for nonfederal jobs, and lower quit rates for civil service
employees. The fact that governments in both Canada and the United
States appear to underprice their fully indexed annuities suggests
that it is not possible to infer that these workers are sufficiently risk
averse to demand fully indexed pensions. This issue is discussed by
Feldstein (1981) and Pesando (1981).24
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Real Rates of Return in Canada 1953—1980, Bills, Bonds and Stocks
91—day Long—term Common Inflation
Year Treasury Bills Canada Bonds Stocks (C.P.I.)
1953. 1.71 3.61 2.72 0.0
1954 0.83 9.20 38.46 0.60
1955 1.32 —0.61 27.32 0.30
1956 0.17 —6.45 8.90 3.10
1957 1.58 4.08 —22.37 2.15
1958 —0.26 —8.17 28.16 2.52
1959 3.39 —5.84 3.04 1.37
1960 1.83 5.56 0.33 1.35
1961 2.68 9.48 32.41 0.13
1962 2.42 1.42 —8.70 1.59
1963 1.70 2.66 13.50 1.83
1964 1.79 4.48 22.96 1.93
1965 1.05 —1.87 3.57 2.90
1966 1.39 —1.92 —10.28 3.55
1967 0.48 —5.99 13.32 4.14
1968 2.09 —4.37 17.53 4.09
1969 2.50 —6.47 —5.29 4.58
1970 4.46 19.67 —5.01 1.46
1971 —1.41 5.98 2.84 5.04
1972 —1.46 —3.76 21.14 5.09
1973 —3.34 —6.78 —8.70 9.12
1974 —4.13 —12.48 —34.76 12.46
1975 —1.91 —6.09 9.31 9.48
1976 2.88 11.99 4.82 5.82
1977 —1.98 —3.32 0.43 9.50
1978 0.23 —6.56 19.25 8.43
1979 1.76 —11.14 31.64 9.76
1980 1.42 —8.22 16.83 11.21
Mean 0.82 —0.78 7.97 4.41
Standard
Deviation 2.02 7.60 17.02 3.67
Correlation
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Bills .526 .216 —.623




Notes:Data are drawn from C.G. Canton, D.D. Ezra and K.P. Sharp,
"Canadian Investment Returns and Other Economic Statistics,
1926—1980", where details regarding the calculation of the
individual series may be found. The annual return on Treasury
Bills is obtained by the successive purchase of 91—day Treasury
Bills at the end of each quarter.